The launch of the ASEAN Regional Forum resonated with the ideas of comprehensive security enshrined in ASEAN processes and the new ideas of co-operative security developed in Europe in the late 1980s.
That fusion, what might be called ‘Co-operative Security 1.0,’ has been an integral part of a system that has enjoyed peace for a generation. But it is no longer enough to address increasing nationalism and the tensions produced as the rise of China challenges the predominance of the US. It’s time to develop “Co-operative Security 2.0.”
Being a middle power in today’s world is far different than it was when the concept was ascendant in the 1990s. The dream of an inclusive multilateral world has stalled and great power politics have reemerged in the Asia-Pacific region.
South Korea's challenge is dealing with the security challenges and great power rivalry on the Korean Peninsula, alleviating Chinese concerns over trilateral co-operation, and shaping a regional order away from zero-sum security competition.
Trust deficits in East Asia stand in the way of a genuine security community in much of the region. The key to overcoming that is empathy, a concept new to the discourse on security order.
Asia’s political and strategic diversity is an obstacle to a co-operative security order that will require shared values as well as common interests.
The rise of China and its assertive stance on maritime disputes is fueling moves to enhance old Cold War alliances.
Despite a complex emerging order, traditional security alliances will still play a role, but through more complex institutional arrangements.
The balance of power is changing in favor of Beijing, but it need not lead to conflict.
New approaches are needed to the Asia-Pacific security architecture, especially given China’s rise and rivalry to the US.
How a co-operativesecurity order for East Asia has evolved and what kind of order isachievable — and appropriate.
There are reasons to be optimistic about change in North Korea, but now South Korea will be much less of a part of this process than it could and should be.
In the words of an old Chinese proverb, sacrificing the plum tree for the peach tree. It was the right decision.
The ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting turns 10 in 2016. In its next decade, it will need to preserve both its relevance and ASEAN centrality in the regional security architecture.
While North Korea has been trying to repair its relations with China and draw closer to Russia, its January nuclear test calls into question Kim Jong Un’s diplomatic efforts to use Russia as a way to pressure China.
The AIIB represents a significant milestone in China’s emergence as a regional leader, and Washington’s ham-fisted opposition to its creation dismayed its allies in Asia and even Europe and played into China’s hands.
A call for mutual respect and co-existence among great and small powers in East Asia.
China is likely performing better than it is being given credit for by the Nuclear Security Index.
The gap in perception is troubling, but India is well advised to reflect on its position and make improvements.
The Nuclear Security Index is a helpful tool in assessing some aspects of nuclear security, writes Pervez Hoodbhoy, but it cannot capture the unique threats that Pakistan faces from loyalties divided between faith and nation.
Of all the regions in the world, the concerns are the greatest regarding Asia–Pacific when it comes to nuclear security vulnerabilities
Asia’s Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan By Mark Fitzpatrick, Complexity, Security and Civil Society in East Asia: Foreign Policies and the Korean Peninsula Edited by Peter Hayes and Kiho Yi etc.
Fateful Ties: A History of America’s Preoccupation with China, By Gordon H. Chang